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Abstract 
This research investigates disruptive innovation through the under-explored relationship between two 
ecological concepts, exaptation and ecosystems. Exaptation-driven innovation involves exploiting 
unintended latent functions of pre-existing technologies. Digital innovation ecosystems account for 
industry-spanning co-operative and competitive dynamics among firms related to innovations that 
combine physical and digital elements, such as 3D printing. In this work the evolution of the 3D printing 
ecosystem is traced over four decades, from the first patents—presented as exaptation-driven 
innovations—to the present threat of disruption to established manufacturing. Through a longitudinal 
narrative study of the formation and growth of this ecosystem, a four-phase process model is developed. 
This addresses gaps in the exaptation and disruptive innovation literatures with respect to innovation 
ecosystems. The implications for theory are that disruption requires an appropriate supporting ecosystem, 
but ecosystems take on a life of their own, so cultivating a healthy ecosystem means sowing the seeds of 
disruption within that ecosystem. For practice, this research highlights the managerial challenges of 
predicting disruption by exaptation-driven innovations and the constant competition for niches within 
ecosystems. For policy, it outlines implications concerning how best to support new innovation 
ecosystems and cultivate exaptation opportunities. 




1. Introduction  
The concept of disruptive innovation describes how a new technology alters a performance improvement 
trajectory or redefines how performance is understood. The phenomenon has been studied in numerous 
contexts, for example, in computer storage, where market leadership changed over successive generations 
of disk drives, despite the leader in each generation appearing inferior to its predecessor (Christensen, 
1997). Research shows that disruptive innovations simultaneously disrupt some incumbents while 
enhancing the positions of others (Ho and Lee, 2015). Additionally, some incumbents successfully 
respond to potential disruptions (Ansari & Krop, 2012) by adapting their business models (Cozzolino et 
al., 2018), by extending the current generation of technology (Adner & Kapoor, 2016) or even by co-
operating with disruptors (Ansari et al., 2016). To better understand the heterogeneous outcomes of 
potentially disruptive innovations, it is helpful to consider innovation ecosystems. Ecosystems are complex 
systems consisting of actors that are inter-dependent, co-evolving and in possession of agency (Choi et 
al., 2001). Ecosystems are self-resembling (Sahal, 1981), meaning that the system at a high-level, 
resembles the structure of sub-systems and components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Fixson and Park, 
2008). This characteristic means that the modularity of technological artifacts is reflected in the structure 
of the ecosystem, since the producers of modules are arranged hierarchically in supply chain tiers 
resembling the artifact’s modular hierarchy. Any technology can be viewed as a system of modular 
components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). These components may be designed to perform a function in the 
artifact, but artifacts regularly re-use components that were initially designed for other functions (Arthur, 
2009). As the technology grows in scale and complexity – i.e. as improvements enhance its performance – 
its complexity and number of components increase, making it difficult for a single organization to control 
(Sahal, 1981, Baldwin and Clark, 2000). A system of interdependent organizations – an innovation 
ecosystem – becomes necessary to develop and combine the modules, leading to a complex, hierarchical 
and self-organizing structure that resembles a biological ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004).  
Innovation ecosystems consist of customers, suppliers and complementors that co-operate and compete 
in search of survival and dominance (Moore, 1993). Substitution occurs when one actor expands its niche, 
to take over the roles of others (Sahal, 1981). Shimano combined six components into a bicycle drive-
chain unit, thereby taking market share away from previous market leaders (Fixson and Park, 2008). And 
Intel and Microsoft went from being suppliers to IBM, to the most important actors in the Personal 
Computer (PC) ecosystem as the relative importance of different modules changed (Fine, 1998). 
Substitution may also result when new entrants replace a process or technology – as when Apple 
introduced a touch-screen phone, thereby disrupting market leading cell-phone producers such as Nokia. 
We propose a distinction between internal disruption and external disruption. Internal disruption refers to 
competition for niches within an ecosystem, illustrated by the Shimano and IBM examples above, while 
external disruption refers to a disruptive innovation introduced by an actor external to an ecosystem, such 
as Apple’s entry into the cell-phone ecosystem.  
Innovations increasingly combine digital information processing with physical and mechanical 
components to create complex and novel functionality (Candi and Beltagui, 2019). Producing these 
innovations relies on complex, co-operative interconnections that cut across hardware and software 
industry boundaries, often in unpredictable ways (Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner, 2017). 
For example, automobile producers, which have become used to operating within a familiar ecosystem of 
producers and suppliers, face disruption from firms external to their ecosystem that develop autonomous 
vehicles, by co-opting digital technologies and leveraging digital ecosystem resources. The Global 
Positioning System that was developed for weapons guidance, gained commercial use in consumer 
smartphones, generating geographic data that can now be used to guide autonomous vehicles. This means 
that firms in the car industry, such as Audi and BMW, now face disruption from Google and Apple (The 
Economist, 2015), which capitalize on unintended functions of digital technologies. Figure 1 illustrates 
the complexity and modularity that define ecosystems and give rise to competition and disruption. 
Figure 1 here 
The purpose of this research is to understand the mechanisms by which disruption takes place in digital 
innovation ecosystems. It seeks to understand how these ecosystems form, grow and disrupt. A 
promising lens, which can shed light on these questions is that of exaptation. Exaptation is a term used by 
evolutionary biologists to describe features that are co-opted for alternative functions (Gould and Vrba, 
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1982), for example dinosaur feathers that evolved for temperature regulation and later found a new 
function when their owners evolved the ability to fly. Drawing from Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing (2016) 
and Andriani et al. (2017), exaptation-driven innovation is the exploitation of latent functionality in existing 
artifacts for new contexts. Both a functional shift and non-anticipation, or serendipity, are required for 
classification as exaptation (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016). For example, several examples of 
pharmaceuticals with unexpected side-effects – i.e. latent functionality – have led to new market 
opportunities (Andriani et al., 2017). Given such market opportunities, exaptation offers a route to 
innovation by allowing an artifact or one of its modules to be co-opted for a new function, potentially 
disrupting firms whose offerings previously satisfied that function (Garud et al., 2016). This often comes 
about through serendipitous discovery (Garud et al., 2018), for example, when a module of a radar system 
was discovered to generate sufficient heat to cook food (Andriani and Carignani, 2014). The specific 
module was isolated, combined with other components and brought to market several years later as the 
microwave oven. This innovation can be viewed as disruptive, for example, to fast-food restaurants facing 
a new competitor for customers seeking quick, convenient food. It can also be seen as the foundation for 
a new ecosystem, which is subsequently joined by actors such as producers of ready-meals or microwave-
friendly cooking utensils.  
The literature on disruption tends to focus on established ecosystems, such as that of semiconductor 
technologies, over several generations (Adner and Kapoor, 2016). While disruption may create uncharted 
markets and form new innovation ecosystems, little is known about how such ecosystems form and what 
role exaptation can play in them (Bonifati, 2010; Ching, 2016). To address this gap, we examine the 
ecosystem that has formed around three-dimensional printing (3DP) – a digital innovation. We use the 
term 3DP to refer to additive manufacturing technologies that create physical objects in layers, under 
computer control, directly from digital design models (Petrovic et al., 2011; USPTO, 2017; Candi and 
Beltagui, 2019). The combination of mechanical components such as motors, software such as Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) tools, advanced materials such as liquid polymers and metal powders, and services 
such as direct manufacturing, leads to the recognition of an ecosystem of actors and technologies (Piller 
et al., 2015). The ecosystem’s origins can be traced to the patents for exaptation-driven inventions, 
granted in 1986 and 1992, respectively (Appendix 1). In the years following the introduction of these 
inventions, the ecosystem has grown steadily, capturing the public imagination amid claims of a new 
industrial revolution (Barnatt, 2016; Rüßmann et al., 2015). Debate centers on whether 3DP is currently, 
or could shortly become, disruptive to incumbents in established sectors, for example, the rapid adoption 
of 3DP by major hearing aid producers and the subsequent impact on market position are discussed by 
D’Aveni (2015) and by Sandström (2016). Using a narrative research approach, we develop a four-phase 
process model describing exaptation-driven ecosystem formation, ecosystem growth driven by co-
operation with new ecosystem entrants, internal disruption caused by changing roles or exaptation-driven 
entry, and finally external disruption—whereby the 3DP ecosystem can potentially have a disruptive 
effect on established ecosystems. We map these phases over four decades, and present evidence from a 
range of sources to create a narrative process model linking exaptation to ecosystem formation, growth 
and disruption (Pentland, 1999; Ansari et al., 2016). 
This research makes three important contributions to literature. First, it demonstrates how exaptation-
driven innovation can form the foundation for ecosystem construction as well as niche-construction 
(Andriani and Carignani, 2014). Second, it demonstrates how ecosystem growth creates niches for the 
entry of actors through further exaptation and identifies the presence of resulting internal disruption. 
Thirdly, it provides evidence that ecosystem health and evolution are pre-requisites for external 
disruption. We highlight challenges for managers, which include building an ecosystem by encouraging 
the entry of supporting firms while maintaining a position by controlling a niche or sustaining leadership. 
We also identify challenges for policymakers around the need to support ecosystems by creating the 
appropriate conditions for exaptation. 
2. Literature review 
The disruptive innovation model describes how new entrants overturn the dominance of market leaders, 
despite possessing inferior technological resources (Christensen, 1997). Much of the discourse on 
disruptive innovation is output-centric (Ho and Lee, 2015), focuses on particular cases and attempts to 
explain when and how disruptive innovation occurred (e.g., Keller and Hüsig, 2009; Snihur et al., 2018). 
This research extends our understanding of disruption by drawing on two concepts from biology—
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ecosystems and exaptation—to investigate how new digital innovations generate ecosystems and create 
opportunities for disruption. Previous research has primarily focused on studying established ecosystems 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016), examining how new entrants create disruption within such ecosystems 
(Ansari et al., 2016) or how incumbents respond (Ansari and Krop, 2012). In contrast, the formation of 
ecosystems has drawn limited attention (Dedehayir et al., 2016). How new entrants contribute to 
ecosystem growth and disruption is under-investigated (Autio et al., 2018), and innovation in general 
(Nambisan and Baron, 2013), and exaptation-driven innovation in particular are ill understood in 
ecosystems. 
2.1 Evolutionary metaphors for innovation 
Evolutionary theories of technology suggest that innovation resembles the evolution of species over time 
in a process of descent with modification (Darwin, 1859). For example, mapping the historical 
development of weapons and tools shows how an original design is modified to perform a specific 
function, resulting in a linear evolution and allowing the heritage of an innovation to be traced back over 
generations (Basalla, 1989). Arthur (2009) argues that, at a modular level, every technology is a 
combination of pre-existing modules, components and subsystems, which are “cobbled together” (p.48), 
but then subsequently refined over time to better suit its purpose. Most radical innovations or new 
technologies follow a similar evolutionary pattern. As the technology matures, the supporting systems 
around it grow and create fertile ground for disruptions (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) and, thus, an ecosystem 
is born. 
Carignani et al. (2019) propose a different perspective by introducing horizontal gene transfer (HGT) as a 
metaphor. HGT is “the non-genealogical transfer of genetic material from one organism to another” 
(Goldenfield and Woese, 2007, p.369). It suggests that characteristics can be passed horizontally among 
single-celled organisms, such as when antibiotic resistance is transferred between bacteria, not only 
vertically as in Darwinian evolution. Carignani et al. (2019) use this perspective to explain the 
development of the jet engine by the transfer of modules (compressor, combustor and turbine) from 
other products into the turbojet. Subsequent variants, such as the turboprop and turbofan can be traced 
back to the turbojet, a common ancestor, such that these innovations emerged initially through horizontal 
transfer and then through vertical refinement. Central to this process is the notion that preadapted 
modules are selected to occupy niches in a product architecture. To explain these terms, the following 
sections summarize the literature on ecosystems, which contain niches that are organized in a similar 
structure to the product architecture, and exaptation—which relates to the use of preadapted modules for 
alternative purposes. Before discussing ecosystems and exaptation, however, we discuss the underlying 
mechanism connecting the two, namely modularity (Sahal, 1981; Arthur, 2009, Andriani and Carignani, 
2014). 
2.2 Modularity  
Any artifact can be regarded as a modular system (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), meaning that innovation 
focuses on improving either or both, the architecture of the system or the modules it is comprised of. 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) identify a set of six modular operators as a complete set of actions that 
designers use on any modular design—splitting a design into multiple modules, substituting one module for 
another, augmenting the system through addition of a module, excluding a module from the system, inverting 
to change the architecture, and porting a module to another system. Fixson and Park (2008) extend this 
discussion by adding a seventh operator, namely integrating multiple modules into a single design. The 
effect of integrating modules is to consolidate the supply chain so that previous providers of modules 
may not be required.  
Innovation tends to focus initially on building an entire architecture rather than specific modules. Initial 
success creates a platform for other firms to create both competing and complementary innovations 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). As demand for the innovation grows, competition increases, quite possibly 
bringing on a battle to define standards and establish a dominant design (Suarez and Utterback, 1995). 
When the complexity of the artifact becomes too great for a single firm to manage, others may focus on 
modular innovations (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Specialized firms enter into specific stages of production, 
whereas less specialized firms exit when they are unable to compete effectively (Kapoor, 2013). As the 
various modules evolve, they become strongly functionally interdependent in a manner that makes 
customer demand dependent on the entire system, with little demand for modules in isolation (Gawer 
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and Henderson, 2007). In this way, modularization of artifacts is typically accompanied by disaggregation 
as specializations are accommodated. An exception that proves the rule is the integration of previously 
modularized bicycle drive trains by Shimano (Fixson and Park, 2008). This represents innovation at the 
system architecture level, which was competence-destroying, transforming a previously competitive 
market into a near monopoly by lessening the need for specialized capabilities. However, innovations do 
not always disrupt an entire industry. The impact of digital photography on the incumbents in the camera 
and film processing industries reveals that different modules, and the specialized firms associated with 
them, face differing impacts (Ho & Lee, 2015). The introduction of digital cameras made film processing 
capabilities redundant, disrupting firms such as Eastman Kodak, while arguably leaving producers of 
camera lenses in a better position (Lucas & Goh, 2009). From these examples, we can see that ecosystems 
are modular hierarchical architectures, which resemble the architecture of artifacts, comprising firms that 
create modules or assemble architectures. We also see that new technologies disrupt actors by displacing 
modules and the actors that create them.  
2.3 Innovation Ecosystems 
The academic discourse is moving away from an output-centric view of industries, e.g., the auto industry 
or the cochlear ear implant industry (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and towards a focus on ecosystems, which 
capture the interactions between a variety of actors and incorporate both supply and demand sides 
(Moore, 1993, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Autio and Thomas, 2014; Snihur et al., 2018). Ecosystems 
are complex adaptive systems (Choi et al., 2001) characterized by the interplay among the behaviors of 
individual actors and those of the whole system across indeterminate boundaries. They are often defined 
by a focal firm or platform and incorporate both value creation and value appropriation mechanisms 
(Autio and Thomas, 2014). As the relationships among firms and their business partners have become 
more crucial for business success, they have become more complex. This requires alignment among a 
multilateral set of partners (Adner, 2017) that can influence the co-evolution of the ecosystem and 
individual firms (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). This evolution cannot be fully understood by considering 
only individual firms, technologies or artifacts.  Hence, understanding how disruption takes shape 
requires an understanding of the relationships that bind actors in an ecosystem and how these are formed. 
Ecosystems consist of a series of niches that are filled by actors, e.g. species in a biological ecosystem’s 
food-chain or firms in an innovation ecosystem. In the latter, ecosystem leaders create opportunities for 
others (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014) and profit by providing goods and services 
while contributing to the overall health and diversity of the ecosystem (Nambisan, 2017). Niches are 
occupied by firms that seek to satisfy both their own and the ecosystem’s objectives (Nambisan and 
Baron, 2013; Dedehayir et al., 2016). As with biological ecosystems, new entrants with specialized 
capabilities and features may compete to fill these niches. Ecosystem entrants may emerge and evolve 
from different starting points. For example, studies of biotechnology ecosystems show a variety of entry 
points through which firms use their capabilities and partner with other firms to target appropriate 
market opportunities (Lee and Malerba, 2017). Their entry brings about competition for incumbents 
occupying niches in the ecosystem; meanwhile, diversity and competition for niches are considered 
indicators of ecosystem health (Levin, 1998; Li and Garnsey, 2014).  
Ecosystems that facilitate ease of entry allow competition and the possibility of disruption. Firms survive 
in these ecosystems by facing disruption and adapting to continual threats from new entrants (Moore, 
1996; Ansari and Krop, 2012). For example, some trees evolve fire-resistant seeds as a consequence of 
surviving fires (Levin, 1998), while others do not. Similarly, firms update their capabilities and develop 
new business models in response to competition (Teece, 2010). Diversity, complexity and path-
dependence can mean that ecosystems and their actors may respond differently to external stimuli. Some 
firms in an ecosystem will survive and thrive, whereas others may be disrupted by competition. Moore 
(1993) argues that biological ecosystems where new entrants are rare, such as islands, do not prepare their 
inhabitants to resist competition and the same could be said of industries or countries that facilitate 
monopolies. Just as the introduction of grey squirrels into the United Kingdom has had a negative effect 
on numbers of red squirrels, the emergence of international competition has had a negative effect on 
businesses in many countries. 
The fate of individual firms is at least in part determined by the actions of the ecosystem (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984), which effectively has a life of its own. Changes in one part of an ecosystem can have 
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unexpectedly disruptive impacts in others. For example, the importance of sea otters was recognized 
when oil spills affected their numbers (Estes and Palmisano, 1974). Sea otters eat crabs, which eat sea 
slugs, which eat algae, which otherwise prevents seagrass from receiving sunlight. Similarly, the 
introduction of wolves to Yellowstone National Park has caused elk to keep moving in search of food, 
preventing over-grazing in the same spots and helping to allow trees to thrive. As these examples 
demonstrate, a new entrant may threaten a particular species that it competes with or preys on but 
contributes to a healthy ecosystem’s ability to maintain equilibrium through self-regulation. The literature 
identifies how ecosystem leaders, in seeking to cultivate a healthy ecosystem, may face disruption. This is 
particularly notable in the PC ecosystem, where IBM’s dominant position became an almost irrelevant 
one. Having dominated the mainframe computer industry, IBM did not initially engage with the PC 
ecosystem led by individuals such as Apple founders Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs. While small firms in 
this ecosystem were initially dismissed as hobbyists (much like 3DP startups more recently), once the 
business potential of PCs and the software they developed became evident, this ecosystem and the firms 
within it, began to represent a threat (Wozniak and Smith, 2006). IBM only entered the ecosystem when 
the demand for PCs had become large enough that the scale of its production infrastructure allowed it to 
take a leading role quickly (Moore, 1993). However, IBM failed to manage its position successfully, 
allowing its suppliers, Microsoft and Intel, to command more important roles in the ecosystem, and 
ultimately push it out of PC production. “Intel inside” became more important than IBM on the box 
(Fine, 1998). Examples such as this demonstrate that ecosystem leadership is fluid. 
2.4 Exaptation 
To understand how ecosystems come into being and evolve, we now turn our focus to exaptation. The 
term exaptation was proposed by evolutionary biologists as a complement to adaptation (Gould and 
Vrba, 1982). Whereas adaptation refers to features that develop for a specific function, such as larger 
lungs among Andean mountain people, exaptation refers to features that are later found to be useful for 
unintended functions (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016; Andriani and Cattani, 2016). Innovation 
examples include the repurposing of specialist glass production technology for producing optical fibers 
(Cattani, 2005), compact discs, an audio recording technology, for data storage (Dew, 2007) and laser 
technologies for applications from barcode scanners to surgery (Bonifati, 2010). In each of these 
examples, there is a possibility to disrupt incumbents and the technologies previously used for these 
applications. While the literature provides explanations of how exaptation leads to innovation, the 
disruptive potential of exaptation has not been sufficiently explored. 
Several approaches have been used to delineate types of exaptation. Considering the frequency of 
exaptation in pharmaceutical innovation, Andriani et al. (2017) devised a measure of the functional distance 
between an originally approved use and an emergent one. This is particularly relevant in complex systems, 
in which the potential new uses for an innovation are not fully known (Andriani and Cohen, 2013). In 
such contexts, exaptation plays an important but often overlooked function in the evolution of 
technology and the creation of new markets (Dew and Sarasvathy, 2016). In the innovation literature, 
exaptation has been classified according to the level of effort required to convert from the original to a 
new function. This involves internal and external search processes (Katila and Ahuja, 2002), which may 
cross ecosystem boundaries. Exaptation frequently involves an element of serendipity (Garud et al., 
2018); an interaction between an artifact and a context, often without a specific objective, may bring to 
light alternative functions and allow innovations to emerge. Following Baldwin and Clark’s (2000) 
approach to decomposing artifacts into modules, Andriani and Carignani (2014) distinguish between the 
change of function of the whole artifact, or of its modules. The former requires minimal effort, e.g. the 
tuberculosis drug, Marsilid, was repurposed through marketing as an anti-depressant. Meanwhile, 
changing the function of modules normally requires niche construction (Andriani and Cohen, 2013), a 
substantial effort to build a new architecture around an exapted module. For example, several decades of 
development separated the discovery of an alternative function for the magnetron, a radar component, 
before it came to market in the microwave oven (Andriani and Carignani, 2014; Garud et al., 2016). These 
examples focus on changes in the function of artifacts. However, ecosystems are largely missing from the 
exaptation literature, which is an important omission.  
2.5 An exaptation-driven model of ecosystem formation and disruption 
Ecosystems are hierarchical and can be decomposed into sub-systems, which co-evolve (Choi et al., 
2001). At a modular level, exaptation entails building a new structure around a module taken from an 
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existing technology (Andriani and Carignani, 2014). A possibility that has not previously been expressed 
in the exaptation literature is that a new ecosystem may form around the exaptation-driven innovation. A 
case in point is that of the Gutenberg printing press (Andriani and Carignani, 2014). In this case, 
Gutenberg co-opted the functionality of a press used for squeezing juice from grapes to make wine. He 
applied the idea of pressing against a flat surface to printing, thus laying the foundation for the paper 
publication ecosystem that is still in force. Thus, Gutenberg’s exaptation formed the foundation for an 
ecosystem.  
As discussed above, new technologies can emerge from combinations of previously existing modules 
(Arthur, 2009; Andriani and Carignani, 2014), which are then refined over time, evolving to suit a 
function to which they are applied (Basalla, 1989). This evolution is accompanied by a growth in the 
supporting ecosystem (Sahal, 1981; Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and the configuration of the technology is 
subject to experimentation and variation until there is agreement on a best approach (Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995). Drawing from theories of disruptive innovation, ecosystems, exaptation and modularity, 
we can model the birth and growth of an innovation ecosystem and how this growth facilitates disruption 
within the ecosystem and then in other ecosystems in four phases as shown in Figure 2.   
Figure 2 here 
Ecosystems are hierarchically composed in a structure that resembles the composition of modules in a 
product architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Fixson and Park, 2008; Arthur, 2009). Thus, ecosystem 
roles describe the relationships between firms such as suppliers and producers (Dedehayir et al., 2019) 
and the modules and architectures these firms are responsible for creating (see figure 1). Modular 
exaptation, therefore, involves a module of the architecture being ported into a new architecture by a firm 
that also moves from its original ecosystem into a new, unpopulated ecosystem (phase 1 in Figure 1). 
Andriani and Carignani (2014) demonstrate that considerable effort is required to turn an exapted module 
into a marketable product. They suggest that constructing an architecture around the exapted module 
requires specialized capabilities, which means innovation may be decentralized to firms possessing these 
capabilities. As a result, firms migrate into the new ecosystem from their original ecosystems (phase 2), as 
the ecosystem leader cannot expect to possess all of the capabilities required to produce the entire 
architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2009). Every technology exploits one or more phenomena to fulfil a 
function (Arthur, 2009), but changing a module means that a phenomenon and the capabilities required 
to exploit it may change. For example, for digital cameras, the change from chemical to digital technology 
means a change in the firms that fill a particular niche, even as other modules and firms, such as lens 
manufacturers, retain their places (Lucas and Goh, 2009). While a linear evolutionary development can be 
expected as the exapted innovation continues to be modified and improved, the need to access 
capabilities external to the nascent ecosystem draws on horizontal transfer of modules (Carignani et al., 
2019). As a result, competition within the ecosystem intensifies as firms that have entered at different 
times compete to define the standards (Suarez and Utterback, 1995). Simultaneously, the competition for 
ecosystem niches and dominance sees suppliers and customers beginning to compete, just as IBM faced 
disruption from its suppliers (Moore, 1993; Fine, 2000). The health of the ecosystem as a whole is aided 
by openness to new entrants, which brings with it disruption to ecosystem members and a requirement 
for resilience to survive (phase 3). Mapping this evolution against the typical path of disruptive innovation 
(Christensen, 1997), we can surmise that the competition inside the ecosystem also leads to performance 
improvements in the technologies employed. As new firms enter and compete for ecosystem niches, they 
also transfer their technologies to the new application (Carignani et al., 2019) and compete to define 
standards (Suarez and Utterback, 1995). Finally, the performance improvements may enable a technology 
to realize its disruptive potential in other ecosystems (phase 4). 
3. Research Method 
 
3.1 Research Setting 
The 3DP ecosystem was examined to investigate the interrelationships among exaptation, innovation 
ecosystems and disruption. This ecosystem has grown slowly over several decades, around inventions that 
we identify as exaptation-driven innovations. Subsequent growth has been rapid. Global revenues for 
3DP products and services grew from approximately $1bn in 2009 to over $2bn in 2012, to over $5bn in 
2015, with compound annual growth over 30% over most of this period (Wohlers, 2016). 3D Systems 
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and Stratasys combined account for over a fifth of the total. By comparison, the total sales revenues of 
firms now entering the ecosystem, such as Ricoh Company Ltd and its subsidiaries ($18.6bn), HP Inc. 
($103.4bn) and General Electric Co. ($115.9bn), illustrate the strategic value these firms see in 3DP. 3DP 
technologies are reaching sufficient maturity that the 3DP ecosystem could disrupt more established 
manufacturing technologies, leading such firms to respond by leveraging their research, production and 
marketing resources similar to IBM’s entry into the PC ecosystem. 
Studying this ecosystem at present is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, its origins can be traced back to 
the original patent for stereolithography, granted in 1986 (Appendix 1), allowing a reasonable 
investigation of its formation. This contrasts with previous studies that examine disruption within 
established ecosystems (e.g. Christensen, 1997; Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Ansari et al., 2016). Secondly, 
the expiry of the first patents has contributed to a growth in interest, ecosystem entry and disruptive 
potential. This allows investigation of how exaptation facilitates ecosystem entry as well as revealing the 
links between exaptation and disruption. Thirdly, the co-existence of vastly different processes and 
applications in the same space provides an opportunity to study a diverse ecosystem that may later 
disperse into more specialized sub-systems. For example, production of laser sintered aerospace 
components from titanium powder is vastly different from the use of desktop machines for prototyping 
consumer products, yet 3DP is used as a shorthand for both. Finally, by combining software with 
mechanical and chemical processes, this is a genuinely diverse ecosystem (Petrovic et al., 2011; Piller et al., 
2015) and provides a template for understanding future digital technologies.  
This research exploits the timely opportunity to examine the 3DP ecosystem while it remains diverse, 
experiences rapid growth and sees relatively small firms competing for future leadership. A narrative 
approach is used to examine the formation and growth of the 3DP ecosystem and derive findings related 
to exaptation and disruption. 
3.2 Data Sources 
There is a growing trend for the use of secondary data, including from internet sources, for academic 
research (Kozinets, 2002). For example, Franzoni and Sauermann (2014) use examples of online projects 
to contribute an understanding of crowd science and its role in innovation. On the topic of 3DP, West 
and Kuk’s (2016) study of the complementarity of openness uses a variety of sources to present a case 
study of how Stratasys supports open source communities to create demand for its proprietary products. 
In addition to secondary data from Stratasys’ websites and from online communities, West and Kuk 
(2016) draw from the Wohlers report (Wohlers, 2016), an industry analysis that has been published 
annually since 1993. We follow this approach to data collection by drawing on industry reports (Rüßmann 
et al., 2015; Wohlers, 2016; Müller and Karevska, 2016), academic publications (e.g. D’Aveni, 2015; West 
and Kuk, 2016) and books (Barnatt, 2016; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015) as well as firm websites, press 
releases and news reports.  
3.3 Narrative method 
A narrative is an interpretive description of historical facts that seeks to give meaning to a series of events 
(Gabriel, 2000). Narrative studies are valuable for examining processes, allowing the researcher to 
understand events, how and why they occurred and how they lead phenomena taking shape over time 
(Pentland, 1999). This is because narratives are enacted and performed, meaning the telling of the story is 
linked to the performance of the actions (Garud et al., 2014). Researchers construct narratives by 
identifying a series of key events and capturing the perspectives of the actors involved to understand 
these actors’ interpretations of the events. For example, Narayanan et al. (2009) examine the development 
of dynamic capabilities within two divisions of a pharmaceutical firm through the construction of group 
narratives, while Brown (1998) examines the tensions between stakeholders during an information system 
implementation project. Such studies are commonly used in innovation research to uncover the 
mechanisms behind historical processes and help to shape our understanding of why certain events 
happened or how to manage them in the future. The narrative approach has been widely used in 
exaptation research to understand the processes involved (Cattani, 2005; Andriani and Carignani, 2014). 
Garud et al. (2016) argue that the process of exaptation-driven innovation is itself a narrative approach, 
which lends support to studying the evolution involved using a narrative perspective. Most narrative 
studies focus on longitudinal analysis of one or two cases, aiming for depth of understanding. For 
example, Ansari et al.’s (2016) study of TiVo, Fixson and Park’s (2008) study of Shimano, or West and 
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Kuk’s (2016) study of Makerbot and its Thingiverse platform. Other studies capture multiple cases, 
looking for similarities in the processes observed within these cases (e.g. Andriani and Carignani, 2014; 
Franzoni and Sauermann, 2014; Garud et al., 2016).  
The 3DP ecosystem is the unit of analysis of the present work, and a longitudinal approach is used to 
study how the ecosystem has evolved. There is a particular focus on two firms, 3D Systems and Stratasys. 
These firms were chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, they are identified as the earliest surviving 
members of the 3DP ecosystem, due to their patents for Stereolithography (SLA)1 in 1986 and Fused 
Deposition Modelling (FDM)2 in 1992, respectively, and are cited by most reviews of the field as the 
earliest commercial sellers of 3D printers (Bandyopadhay et al., 2015). The origins of what is now referred 
to as the 3DP ecosystem can be traced to these two firms, their founders and original patents, and they 
offer a valuable opportunity to examine how exaptation-driven innovations can lead to ecosystem 
formation. Secondly, these two firms remain the largest industrial 3D printer producers in the world by 
sales (Wohlers, 2016) and by market capitalization, as shown in Appendix 1. Additional firms were 
selected for inclusion in the narrative by identifying co-operations within the timeline shown in Figure 3 
as well as analyzing current trends and market positions. Ricoh and HP are important to the narrative 
since both co-operated with Stratasys as well as now competing, while GE was identified through analysis 
of the ecosystem due to its acquisition of 3DP firms such as Arcam and Concept Laser (e.g., Wohlers, 
2016).  
3.4 Data analysis 
Following Ansari et al. (2016), a narrative of the 3DP ecosystem was constructed based on a range of data 
sources. By identifying key events and dates in a timeline, we were able to search online repositories for 
news reports, for example relating to mergers, acquisitions, product launches or legal disputes. We made 
use of firms’ websites, including press releases, patent and product information, annual reports and 
published accounts. Additionally, we were able to use publicly available videos, including interviews, 
television appearances and keynote speeches by executives. The authors attended industry events where 
the firms exhibited and promoted their offerings, while one of the authors also attended an event run for 
local customers and partners of one of the firms, providing insights into strategy and products. These 
diverse longitudinal data allowed triangulation from multiple sources (Jick, 1979). They were captured in a 
written narrative and a timeline of key events (Figure 3). This timeline allowed comparative analysis, from 
which key themes emerged and led to the identification of the phases of evolution outlined in the findings 
and Table 3. 
We apply patent citations as one means by which to identify exaptation, demonstrating both a functional 
shift and an element of non-anticipation (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016) or serendipity (Garud et al., 
2018), as operationalized by Andriani et al., (2017). Patents indicate the intended function of an invention, 
through an assigned classification, while patent citations in different classifications indicate how 
technologies are applied to new functions (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016). Patents have been used 
widely for studying a particular type of product, such as airbags (Fixson and Lee, 2012) or to understand 
how firms search for new knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 2012) and are helpful indicators of ecosystem 
entry. However, measuring the distance between functions can be arbitrary without a relevant typology 
for understanding technology and function (Andriani et al., 2017) and delineating the boundaries of an 
ecosystem can be challenging. To overcome these challenges, we focus on the B33Y classification of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which includes “manufacturing of 3D objects by additive 
deposition, additive agglomeration or additive layering, e.g. by 3D printing, stereolithography or selective laser sintering” 
(USPTO, 2017). To consider ecosystem entry, we identify instances of exaptation by examining a firm’s 
patents cited in the B33Y classification. For example, Ricoh was granted US patent No. 8,192,9173, 
classified within the B33Y patent classification. This cites their own previous patent, US No. 
                                                     
 
1 U.S. Patent 4,575,330, filed August 8, 1984, granted November 3, 1986. 
2 U.S. Patent 5,121,329, filed October 30, 1989, granted June 9, 1992. 
 
3 Filed June 28, 2007, Granted June 5, 2012. 
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20,080,092,3104, which was classified under B22F1 (Nanofibres or nanotubes), demonstrating their use of 
internal knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). This is evidence of exaptation as the patent classification 
identifies the intended function, and the citation in a different classification shows the identification of a 
previously unintended function (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016; Andriani et al., 2017). We also take this 
as evidence that Ricoh operates in multiple ecosystems, including 3DP. 
 
4. Findings 
The timeline in Figure 3 provides an overview of the key events identified in the narrative of the 3DP 
ecosystem, with a focus on the original actors, Stratasys and 3D Systems. Based on an analysis of this 
narrative, we identified four phases in the development of the 3DP ecosystem, which are, in 
chronological order, the ecosystem formation—arising through exaptation, a period of ecosystem growth and 
subsequent phases of internal disruption and external disruption. Each of these phases is discussed below. 
Figure 3 here 
4.1 Exaptation 
Early efforts to develop 3DP technologies can be identified in the R&D labs of various firms in Japan 
and Europe. But the first patent and the first firm to commercialize 3DP can be traced to Charles 
“Chuck” Hull, an engineer and would-be entrepreneur, employed by a struggling firm producing liquid 
coatings, hardened by ultraviolet radiation on products such as furniture. Driven by frustration at the time 
taken for prototyping his product designs, Hull spotted a potential solution by exploiting the latent 
functionality of the firm’s technology. 
“I put two and two together, if I could cure lots of these layers, I could have a real plastic part. So that was just kind of the 
basic aha! And then it was all the effort to make that happen.” 5 
Following a period of experimentation, Hull produced the first 3D print in 1983 and registered a patent in 
1986 for the process of stereolithography (SLA, see Appendix 1 for the patent reference). With his 
employer unable to support the invention, Hull formed 3D Systems to commercialize the patent. 
Independently, Scott Crump developed his 3DP technology, Fused Deposition Modelling (FDM) in his 
home, with the purpose of creating toys for his daughter. By combining elements of a 2D plotter with a 
hot-glue gun and a combination of materials including candle-wax, he could build an object in layers. 
Crump started Stratasys shortly afterwards and was granted his first patent in 1989 (see Appendix 1). 
Both these cases represent exaptation-driven innovation since they entail a shift in function (liquid 
coatings to prototyping; gluing to printing) and a serendipitous combination of pre-existing components 
to exploit latent functionality. Both Hull and Crump combined readily-available modules to achieve a new 
function. While the processes differ, at a high level they achieve a similar function, building products 
additively by layering, under computer control. The firms started by the two inventors served existing 
needs, primarily engineers’ need for prototyping tools and services. However, they had little connection to 
existing ecosystems and can be regarded as the founders of the 3DP ecosystem.  
Even in this early phase, enthusiasm led to optimistic, albeit vague, predictions of 3DP’s disruptive 
potential. For example, in a 1989 interview, Hull suggested that “it does for engineering and manufacturing what 
the Xerox machine or the word processor or both of those do for the office environment” 6. In the same interview, 3D 
Systems’ CEO, Raymond Freed suggested that with “probably five or more years’ hard research” it would 
“revolutionize” production. Exaptation can be viewed as a first important, but not sufficient, step in 
developing disruptive innovations, but as the story of the early days of 3DP shows, for innovations to 
reach their disruptive potential, a suitable ecosystem is needed. This brings us to the second phase in the 
development of an ecosystem—the growth of the ecosystem. 
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5 Interview with TCT magazine, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQMJAg45gFE last accessed 13th June 2018  




4.2 Ecosystem Growth 
The first indication that an ecosystem is required can be seen from the development of a software 
standard in support of 3DP. Chuck Hull recognized that to engage designers who would benefit from 
3DP, Computer Aided Design (CAD) software would need to convert digital models into an appropriate 
form. He developed and patented a process for file conversion, which enabled designers to print their 
CAD models, as well as the .stl file format, which remains the standard for 3DP. Recognizing that CAD 
developers would be reluctant to include support for an unknown, proprietary file format in their 
software, ecosystem growth was prioritized over control.  
“I just made the decision, let’s make that public. We basically declared that we would not enforce that patent and so that 
basically freed it up so that people would write to it.”  7 
This demonstrates that, following exaptation, an innovator may need to engage with other actors, to 
ensure adoption of the new technology. Standards help to enable co-operation (Suarez and Utterback, 
1995), and when considering technology at a modular level, specifying a design early enables the entry of 
other firms into the ecosystem.   
3D Systems and Stratasys continued to develop their core technologies, but their growth included 
interactions with modular innovators whose involvement expanded the ecosystem. 3D Systems partnered 
with other firms to develop materials. Like software standards, print materials are crucial for 3DP and 
demand growth so the continued development of 3DP required specialized firms with capabilities in 
chemical science and materials (Fixson and Park, 2008).  
Additionally, 3D Systems continued to develop new 3DP technologies using other materials such as wax 
and metal (Wohlers, 2016). These new technologies are distinct from SLA (stereolithography) and FDM 
(Fused Deposition Modelling) but belong to the same ecosystem because they share modules, achieve 
similar functions and exploit some of the same phenomena (Arthur, 2009). 3D Systems’ exploration of 
processes and materials brought the firm into conflict with other firms in the growing ecosystem. This 
included several patent infringement cases and an antitrust investigation leading to part of its operations 
being sold (see Figure 3). 3D Systems commenced a broad acquisition program, purchasing a variety of 
small firms involved in the development of materials, software and other related technologies. Scaling up 
from an innovation demands modular innovation, which also requires expansion of capabilities through 
the involvement of specialized firms (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). While an ecosystem may naturally expand 
as opportunities are recognized (Sahal, 1981; Arthur, 2009), 3D Systems’ acquisition strategy suggests an 
attempt to maintain control of the growing ecosystem.  
For Stratasys, a key event was the launch of their Genisys printer in 1996. This product was based on 
technology acquired from IBM in order to resolve a potential patent infringement and proved the catalyst 
for several further products in the following years. Stratasys also grew through several strategic 
acquisitions that expanded its scope. Key among these was the merger with Objet in 2012, which added 
material jetting technology to the previous focus on extrusion products. The two firms had previously co-
operated through a distribution arrangement. Stratasys also co-operated with other firms, for example 
producing Hewlett-Packard (HP) branded products and relying on Ricoh for modules for its own Objet 
range of printers. As in the case of 3D Systems, this co-operation demonstrates an effort to guide the 
growth of the 3DP ecosystem by connecting with other firms:  
“…we collaborate with strategic partners in our ecosystem to streamline the integration of 3D printing solutions into the 
business processes of our customers.” (Stratasys, 2014, p33) 
There may, however, be unintended consequences of bringing potential competitors into the ecosystem. 
Ricoh entered the 3DP ecosystem in 2000 as a supplier to Stratasys. According to an ongoing agreement, 
Ricoh provided “print heads and associated electronic components…with a non-transferable, non-exclusive right to 
assemble, use and sell the Ricoh Products under Ricoh's patent rights and trade secrets” (Stratasys, 2013). Modules used 
in Ricoh’s 2D inkjet printers are used to achieve a similar function in 3DP—the print head sprays a 
                                                     
 
7 Interview with TCT magazine, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQMJAg45gFE last accessed 13th June 2018 
12 
 
photo-sensitive liquid polymer, which is then hardened by a light source. Whereas Ricoh plays a key role 
in the 2D printing ecosystem, its role in 3DP, was initially very limited. Later development activity saw 
this position change. The ecosystem began to grow through the ecosystem leaders’ collaborations with 
other firms, as well as new firms finding opportunities. With this proliferation of ecosystem actors, the 
next phase is one of internal disruption in which early players seek to defend their position as ecosystem 
leaders while other actors create opportunities that might lead to disruption. 
4.3 Internal disruption 
The next phase sees 3D Systems, and Stratasys explicitly use the term ecosystem as they describe the 
comprehensive range of capabilities they control and the solutions they offer.  
“We are pursuing a strategy focused on offering a comprehensive ecosystem… We are focused on innovation and new products 
to drive expansion into 3D production through improving durability, reliability, repeatability and total cost of operations of 
3D printing solutions.” (3D Systems, 2017, 28) 
 “Integrated solutions offering/ecosystem. We provide an integrated solutions offering that includes compatible products and 
services that are designed to meet the full gamut of our clients’ needs in an efficient manner, consisting of a broad range of 
systems, consumables and services” (Stratasys, 2015, 33). 
The acquisition programs initiated in the previous phase created the foundation for these firms to provide 
a broad range of offerings, including on-demand printing services and installation of customized printers. 
The need for these services may be observed by examining the sales revenues shown in Appendix 2. 
Three features of these statistics are particularly notable. Firstly, the growth in revenues between 2009 and 
2014 as the maturity and availability of technologies helped increase demand for 3DP products, with 3D 
Systems and Stratasys benefiting. While product sales have declined since 2014, service revenues continue 
to grow and show potential to become larger. This is a typical feature of markets in which a large installed 
base means less scope for new product sales (Beltagui, 2018). It also demonstrates the growth of the 
ecosystem in terms of modular innovations in supporting services. Finally, the fall in revenues in the two 
firms demonstrates growing competition within the ecosystem as other firms, including collaborators that 
challenge their positions, enter the ecosystem. For example, Ricoh acted as a key supplier, and HP 
provided a distribution channel for Stratasys in the previous phase, whereas in this phase, both compete 
directly with Stratasys. 
Ricoh’s technological capabilities, seen through patent activity, lie in optical technologies (e.g. in the US 
patent classification G03G—Electrography and electrophotography) and others used in office equipment 
such as copiers, fax machines and projectors. Ricoh’s competitors are traditionally “other large manufacturers 
and distributors of office equipment” (Ricoh, 2011, p.4) but the firm recognizes that “as digital and other new 
technology develops…Ricoh may find itself competing with new competitors that develop such new technologies… it is possible 
that new competitors or alliances among existing and new competitors may emerge and rapidly acquire significant market 
share” (p4). The response to this threat of disruption is partly an aggressive attempt to be similarly 
disruptive in other ecosystems. Ricoh’s growth strategy includes “pursuing possibilities of printing technologies 
[by transferring these technologies from] ‘display printing’ to ‘applied printing’ [including 3DP in manufacturing, electronics 
and bioprinting applications]”8. 
Ricoh launched a 3DP business division in September 2014, but patenting activity in the previous decade 
demonstrates the effort required to implement their growth strategy. Ricoh’s first patent in the B33Y 
classification9 demonstrates search breadth (Katila and Ahuja, 2002), expanding capabilities by drawing on 
external knowledge. Subsequent patents demonstrate search depth, citing Ricoh’s own patents in other 
classifications. For example, in 2012, Ricoh was granted a patent10 related to materials, which cites two 
                                                     
 
8 https://www.ricoh.com/-/Media/Ricoh/Sites/com/IR/data/pre/pdf/ir_pre2018.pdf, last accessed 5th July 
2019. 
9 U.S. Patent 20,050,258,573, Filed May 18, 2004, Granted November 3, 2009. 
10 U.S. Patent 8,192,917, Filed June 28, 2007, Granted June 5, 2012. 
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Ricoh patents, in materials and optical recording11. Since the patent classification defines the intended 
function, we can view this as an exaptation (Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016). The development of a 
growing patent portfolio supports Ricoh’s move from innovating in modules to designing a system 
architecture. In this case, integrating modules (Fixson and Park, 2008) facilitates a change in ecosystem 
role. Through extensive R&D activity, Ricoh moved from a role as a supplier to a manufacturer of 3DP 
equipment and provider of 3DP services. In doing so, Ricoh posed a disruptive threat to actors in the 
3DP ecosystem that mirrored the threat it faced from digital technologies in its own ecosystem. 
A similar journey, from 2D to 3DP, has been taken by HP. Its market share of 40% in 2D printing12, the 
strength of its patent portfolio and the expiry of core 3DP patents, made it logical and feasible for HP to 
enter the 3DP ecosystem. First announced in 2014, HP’s Fusion Jet technology represented a potential 
disruption because it did not fit squarely within any of the established 3DP processes (SLA, FDM, etc.). It 
promised substantial cost savings as well as improvements in production speed and part strength 
compared with existing polymer 3DP processes. This was later followed by Metal Jet products, offering 
competition to metal 3DP processes.  
HP’s entry into the 3DP ecosystem actively disrupted the established actors, including Stratasys and 3D 
Systems, who offered polymer and metal printing respectively. To achieve this, HP built a system 
architecture from a range of existing technology modules, but also through co-operation with partners. 
An example is a B33Y patent13 related to fusible water-soluble films for 3DP. This patent cites three of 
HP’s other patents, on inkjet printing inks14, macromolecular coatings15 and polymers16. As with Ricoh, 
this demonstrates how new functions can be identified for existing knowledge. HP’s first involvement in 
3DP came through a branding partnership with Stratasys (Figure 3) but launching its own products put 
HP in competition with Stratasys.  
The leading firms in this phase of the ecosystem’s lifecycle have established control over resources 
through internal development (e.g. Ricoh uses its own distribution network and maintenance services) or 
acquisitions (e.g. Stratasys and 3D Systems). HP, therefore, looks to co-operate with firms established in 
other ecosystems, such as BASF, with whom they develop materials for 3DP. Moreover, HP seeks to 
promote openness, to help its entry and potential to win market share from ecosystem leaders.  
“an open ecosystem of industry leaders is critical for greater innovation, breakthrough economics, and faster development of 
3D printing materials and applications”17.  
This openness creates opportunities for new entrants, leveraging their existing technologies. There is 
consequent disruption within the ecosystem, but also rapid growth. The next phase could see the early 
disruptive promise of 3DP technologies realized for the first time as the internal disruption in the 
ecosystem helps make external disruption feasible. 
4.4 External Disruption 
As noted previously, the aim of disrupting and revolutionizing existing industries was expressed by 3D 
Systems almost from its inception. However, the subsequent decades of growth have made this aim 
finally appear more realistic. A vital change can be seen, for example by examining the strategy expressed 
in 3D Systems’ annual reports.  
                                                     
 
11 U.S Patent 20,080,092,310 Filed April 27, 2005, Granted Nov 9, 2006. (Material)  U.S Patent 20,090,075,014, Filed 
Sept 13, 2007, Granted March 19, 2009 (Optical Recording) 
12 https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/28/why-is-hp-entering-the-3d-printing-
industry/#2050a25c4a09, last accessed 6th July 2019. 
13 U.S Patent 6,966,960 Filed May 7, 2003, Granted November 2, 2005 
14 European Patent Office 1,227,136, Filed January, 29, 2001, Granted June, 13, 2007 
15 European Patent Office 1,226,975 Filed January, 29, 2001, Granted August, 23, 2006 
16 US Patent 7,365,129 Filed October 14, 2003, Granted April 29, 2008 
17 https://press.ext.hp.com/us/en/press-releases/2017/hp-accelerates-digital-reinvention-of-manufacturing-industry-wit.html, 
last accessed 12th January 2019.  
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“Our principal competitors are companies that manufacture machines that make, or that use machines to make, models, 
prototypes, molds and small-volume to medium-volume manufacturing parts… Our competitors also include other suppliers 
of stereolithography, laser sintering and 3-D printing systems … such as suppliers of Fused Deposition Modeling” (3D 
Systems, 2008, p9). 
“We believe a shift in 3D printing from prototyping to also using additive manufacturing for production is underway. We 
are focused on innovation and new products to drive expansion into 3D production through improving durability, reliability, 
repeatability and total cost of operations of 3D printing solutions.” (3D Systems, 2017, 28) 
Whereas in 2008 competition was restricted to prototyping and suppliers of FDM devices such as 
Stratasys, in 2017 the ambition has become to disrupt large volume production. Achieving this disruption 
depends upon incremental innovation, improving the cost and quality of operations. Similarly, Stratasys 
focuses on “adoption of 3D printing for manufacturing applications..[by] developing professional services capabilities to 
enhance our customers’ ability to use our solutions” (Stratasys, 2014, p33). This rests in part on technology 
maturity, but the health of the ecosystem, which has brought a diverse range of new entrants in the 
previous phase, also contributes. Firms such as HP have similar aims of using 3DP as a means to disrupt 
manufacturing applications. 
“unleashing new possibilities for millions of innovators around the world. No matter your industry, no matter your design 
complexity, no matter what colors fit your business needs… the new HP Jet Fusion 300 / 500 series gives you the freedom 
to create brilliant new parts liberated from the constraints of traditional production methods.”18  
Perhaps the strongest indication that 3DP can enter mainstream applications comes from the activities of 
General Electric (GE), which has rapidly taken a key role in the 3DP ecosystem. GE achieved substantial 
weight-savings by designing a fuel nozzle that integrates around 20 modular components into one, but 
which had proved impossible to produce by traditional means. The solution was to commission Morris 
Technologies to create what became one of the first parts produced by 3DP to be approved by the US 
Federal Aviation Authority. Integrating modules of the artifact profoundly affects the supply chain:  
“To make these parts the ordinary way, you typically need 10 to 15 suppliers, you have tolerances, you have nuts, bolts, 
welds and braces…all of that went away.” (Mohammad Ehteshami, GE Additive19) . 
The results encouraged GE to acquire Morris Technologies and to set up a 3DP business, GE Additive, 
in 2016. The fuel nozzle was put into production in the same year (Ford et al., 2016) in a dedicated 3DP 
factory in Auburn, Alabama, which has produced over 30,000 units, while GE’s medical division has 3D 
printed over 100,000 hip implants. GE has two strategic reasons for its 3DP investment, along with other 
digital technologies. GE has “the most to gain by building the Industrial Internet and additive manufacturing and the 
most to lose by giving it to others.” (General Electric, 2016, p.2). Having seen the benefits in its own aviation 
and medical businesses, GE now recognizes the potential disruption such that this investment protects 
against disruption as well as hampering competitors who may otherwise take advantage of the technology. 
At last 3DP emerges as potentially disruptive to incumbents in manufacturing.  
5. Discussion 
This research set out to understand disruptive innovation and digital innovation ecosystems through the 
lens of exaptation. Based on a longitudinal narrative study of the formation and growth of the 3DP 
ecosystem, we develop a four-phase process model, shown in Table 1. In this section, we explain the 
model, before discussing the findings in relation to the research questions and to extant theory. 
Table 1 here 
5.1 Process Model 
Exaptation plays a vital role in the first phase of the process model, where a new innovation is generated 
by combining modules from existing artifacts, and in the third phase, where firms specialized in 
producing these modules find opportunities and applications. The role of the ecosystem is evident in the 
                                                     
 




second phase, where innovators seek to establish the viability of their exaptation-driven innovation by co-
operation and the third phase in which modular innovators now compete, as well as co-operate, with 
ecosystem actors. Disruption is particularly relevant in the third phase, where it mostly occurs internally 
to the ecosystem, as firms compete to fill niches, but also in the fourth phase, where the exaptation-
driven innovation and ecosystem have evolved sufficiently to threaten incumbents in other ecosystems. 
The connection between exaptation and disruption is characterized by the condition that “not only are 
the market applications for disruptive technologies unknown at the time of their development, they are 
unknowable” (Christensen, 1997, p143). This means that the firms involved in the early phases of the 
ecosystem are unlikely to predict or control the future direction of the technology and the ecosystem.  
The application of this model to 3DP, in Table 1, helps to illustrate how the underlying mechanisms take 
shape. A crucial connection lies in the symmetry between artifact and ecosystem structure, such that 
modular operators at the artifact level influence the structure of the ecosystem (Fixson and Park, 2008). 
We see exaptation taking shape through modular design, for example splitting artifacts into modules and 
porting some of these modules to create a new artifact that fulfils a different function (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Andriani and Carignani, 2014). In this case, individual modules (a laser, a glue gun, a motor) may 
maintain their original functions, but they do so within an artifact that fulfils a new function (building 
three-dimensional objects). This change of function results in the formation of a new ecosystem, since the 
producers of the modules (e.g. producers of the liquid furniture coating and producers of electronic 
components used by Hull in his invention) may have no prior connection to each other or the newly 
exaptation-driven artifact. Thus, in phase 1, exaptation leads to the formation of the 3DP ecosystem, over 
the first decade or so, from the end of the 1980s through the 1990s. 
Once the modules are ported into the new artifact, i.e. 3D printers made by 3D Systems and Stratasys, it 
is logical to assume they will be procured from existing producers, such that the suppliers of these 
modules are effectively invited into the ecosystem. The symmetry between artifact and ecosystem means 
that, as artifacts evolve, the ecosystem of firms that develop them also evolves in size, form and 
complexity (Sahal, 1981). The artifacts created in phase 1 are subjected to splitting in phase 2, to enable 
specialized firms to develop the modules. In this case, the evolution entails the ecosystem leaders building 
collaborative networks to support their development of the exaptation-driven innovations that can appeal 
to the market. Technologies developed by firms such as IBM and Ricoh intersect with the 3DP 
ecosystem, but in this phase, the strategic opportunities are not central for either firm. Hence IBM agreed 
to sell to Stratasys, while Ricoh entered the ecosystem as a supplier. Following exaptation-driven 
innovation, niches are created and can be filled by specialized firms from other ecosystems (Arthur, 
2009), such that in phase 2 we observe the growth of the 3DP ecosystem, through the first decade of the 
21st century in particular. 
Having survived and steadily grown in technological maturity as well as market maturity, the next phase 
sees 3DP become increasingly mainstream, thereby featuring more clearly in the strategies of firms 
connected to the ecosystem. Simultaneously, we see the ecosystem leaders seeking to consolidate their 
position, having grown in size and attempting to control the ecosystem rather than co-operating as 
before. For example, they launch print-bureau services that place them in competition with their 
customers who purchase printers to provide such services. Modularity plays a key role, but this time 
relates to the modules of artifacts and business models as well as actors in the ecosystem. Thus, 3D 
Systems and Stratasys seek to integrate the offerings of their suppliers through mergers (e.g. Stratasys with 
Objet) and acquisitions.  
Meanwhile, firms such as HP and Ricoh move from peripheral to central roles in the 3DP ecosystem by 
building their own artifacts (and supporting services) by splitting, porting and integrating modules. They 
find a new function for the technologies, patents and resources (e.g. dealership and service networks) 
developed in their traditional ecosystems. Survival in this phase of the ecosystem’s evolution is incredibly 
challenging, as can be seen from declining revenues as the number and diversity of competitors grows. 
While 3DP technologies are mature enough to have an established typology, the entry of firms such as 
HP and GE, which apply their size advantages to develop and introduce innovations suggests ongoing 
competition to define dominant designs and consequently, dominance of the ecosystem (Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995). This phase takes shape during the decade from 2010—as the earliest patents begin to 
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expire. Thus, diversity and openness contribute to internal disruption in the 3DP ecosystem during phase 
3. 
Finally, our process model predicts that 3DP may later become mainstream, meaning that disruption 
involving the substitution of established processes with 3DP can take place. This is slowly becoming a 
realistic proposition as use of 3DP in various industries has increased. And it is greatly accelerated by 
firms such as HP and GE, who recognize that they face potential disruption from digital technologies and 
advanced manufacturing technologies. Their entry in the previous phase echoes IBM’s entry into the PC 
ecosystem at the point when technological maturity and market penetration were on the horizon (Moore, 
1993). The errors in ecosystem management made by IBM (Fine, 2000) caused it to be disrupted by its 
own suppliers, as the PC became commoditized. At the low-end, the open-source nature of consumer 
3DP (Raasch et al., 2009; West and Kuk, 2016) means the hardware is already commoditized, as 3D 
Systems found to its cost. At the high-end, the battle for control of the growing 3DP market is closely 
linked to control of the ecosystem, as the ecosystem leaders see their revenues and profits coming from 
the supporting services they have built around the artifacts. Thus, we see GE pursuing an acquisitions-led 
approach, building its 3DP business through the purchase of its suppliers (e.g. Morris Technologies), as 
well as producers of relevant technology (e.g. Arcam) and materials (e.g. AP&C, which itself had been 
acquired by Arcam). In phase 4, we can expect to see competition shifting from internal control towards 
external disruption of other ecosystems. 
5.2 Exaptation and ecosystems 
Considering the relationship between exaptation and ecosystems, we highlight how outcomes can grow 
from humble beginnings, charting the journey from inventions produced by individuals to billion-dollar 
firms at the center of an innovation ecosystem. The literature identifies that exaptation can lead to radical 
innovations (Cattani, 2005) and that it often arises due to serendipitous discoveries by individuals, rather 
than deliberate strategic effort (Garud et al., 2018). Moreover, it demonstrates that this can occur at the 
level of a module, which necessitates a period of niche construction, to develop the artifact into a usable 
product, as observed, for example, with the magnetron and the microwave oven (Andriani and Carignani, 
2014). We add to this by demonstrating how ecosystem construction also takes place. This entails the 
formation of a new ecosystem of co-operating (and potentially competing) firms whose specialized 
resources are applied to building technical architecture.  
The mechanism by which this occurs can be explained with reference to the literature on technology 
evolution and modular design. Like biological organisms, artifacts can be viewed as modular, hierarchical 
systems. When the number of modules reaches a certain level, it becomes necessary for multiple actors to 
design and produce these artifacts (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Biological systems evolve, while artifacts are 
innovated through modifications to the modules over time (Darwin, 1859; Basalla, 1989). The supporting 
ecosystems grow in size and complexity accordingly (Sahal, 1981). In biology, this means niches are 
available for new entrants into the food chain, while in innovation ecosystems, specialized firms enter the 
supply chain (Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Fixson and Park, 2008), in both cases resulting in ecosystem 
growth. The process of niche construction entails “building a technical architecture around the exapted module” 
(Andriani and Carignani, 2014, p.1613) before bringing the product to market. The new technical 
architecture creates opportunity niches, i.e. new functions to be identified for existing technologies, 
(Arthur, 2009), which encourage exaptation (Cattani, 2005).  
Thus, the first contribution of this work is to connect the exaptation and innovation ecosystem 
literatures. We propose that when exaptation-driven innovation results in modules’ change of function 
moving them out of their original ecosystems, niche construction at the artifact level is combined with 
ecosystem construction as collaborators are required to bring the innovation to market. 
5.3 Internal Disruption 
The 3DP ecosystem has increased in diversity as the locus of innovation has moved from the core 
technology to other layers of the ecosystem (Adner, 2017). For example, 3DP-bureau services are proving 
to be an important battleground in which technology developers compete with dedicated service 
providers (Wohlers, 2016; Müller and Karevska, 2016). This fits the general pattern whereby technology 
development tends to move from the system architecture to modules and competition intensifies between 
specialized firms innovating these modules (Fixson and Park, 2008; Ho and Lee, 2015). Diversity, 
competition and indeed disruption, are all indicators of an ecosystem’s health, e.g., Costa Rica’s diverse 
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ecosystem, rich in flora and fauna, is more resilient than Hawaii’s isolated cluster of islands, which few 
new species can reach (Moore, 1993). The complexity of 3DP technologies and their digital nature create 
affordances (Autio et al., 2018) for a variety of new entrants and their technologies to compete for 
ecosystem niches (Nambisan and Baron, 2013). And while initial efforts focus on co-operation to 
establish an ecosystem, once the ecosystem gains legitimacy, it attracts competitors (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994). As a result, the actions taken to construct the ecosystem also cultivate opportunities for internal 
disruption within it. 
Just as complexity in biological systems leads to self-organization or “design without a Designer” (Simon, 
1996, pg.34), an innovation ecosystem can develop a life of its own, beyond the control of the firms 
within it (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The emergent nature of ecosystems means actions at one level 
have systemic impacts. For example, a bird moving slightly to one side, affects those flying around it, 
leading the whole flock to change direction (Choi et al., 2011). Likewise, decisions made early in the 
evolution of an innovation have lasting consequences. This includes the decision to co-operate with firms 
that are likely to disrupt (Ansari et al., 2016), such as Stratasys’ decision to bring Ricoh into the 3DP 
ecosystem or IBM’s involvement with Microsoft and Intel. To avoid the disruption IBM faced in the PC 
ecosystem (Moore, 1993; Fine, 1998), we see attempts to dominate the 3DP ecosystem by merging with 
promising competitors (Stratasys and Objet) or acquiring suppliers. Simultaneously, the suppliers 
themselves may seek to expand their roles in the ecosystem. For example, Ricoh changes from supplying 
print-heads to creating 3D printers, drawing on its existing resources and developing new technology, as 
evidenced by its patenting activity. Internal disruption is made possible by the integration of modules, and 
by the openness of the ecosystem for actors to exapt technologies they previously developed for other 
functions (Fixson and Park, 2008; Garud et al., 2018).  
Our second contribution rests on investigating disruption in the context of an innovation ecosystem and 
considering exaptation as the mechanism for ecosystem entry. We propose that, as an innovation 
ecosystem grows, so does the number and attractiveness of ecosystem niches. The combination of 
openness to new entrants and the possibility of these entrants to exapt can increase the potential for 
internal disruption. 
5.4 External Disruption 
Innovation takes time to generate a disruptive impact. One reason for this is that connections to the 
ecosystem must first be established. This is observed in cases where innovation emerges at the low-end of 
an established ecosystem (Christensen, 1997) and when digital technology is introduced in co-operation 
with incumbents in an ecosystem (Ansari et al., 2016). This is also true of 3DP, which has become 
embedded in the hearing aid and dental implant ecosystems through co-operation between 3DP 
producers and ecosystem leaders (D’Aveni, 2015; Sandström, 2016). Incumbents are disrupted when they 
fail to detect that their ecosystem role may be better filled by an entrant (Ho and Lee, 2015), which is 
possible due to the inherent property of substitution in ecosystems and their modules (Sahal, 1981). But 
this substitution is not possible without an established ecosystem. Exaptation-driven innovations can be 
disruptive (Garud et al., 2016), but their disruptive potential is often realized only when a suitable 
ecosystem is present. Thus, Vestas succeeded where US wind energy firms failed due to Danish 
government support in cultivating an ecosystem (Garud et al., 2018). This support led to exaptations such 
as repurposing resources for boat hulls to produce turbine blades. Similarly, Amazon’s Kindle ebook 
reader succeeded where other products based on the same eInk technology in Japan failed (Parry and 
Kawakami, 2006). The eInk technology can be considered an example of exaptation, which was used by 
different companies, but Amazon succeeded by cultivating an ecosystem – it offered around 9 times as 
many books as Sony, due to differences in agreements with book publishers. Ebook readers such as 
Kindle are potentially disruptive to traditional book publishers, even if ebooks have not replaced printed 
ones. The disruptive threat can be avoided if the threat is recognized and acted upon (Ansari and Krop, 
2012; Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Conversely, in this research we see the potential victims of disruption, 
such as HP and GE, joining the 3DP ecosystem to profit from and defend against what has now become 
apparent to these firms as a disruption. 
3DP has had a disruptive effect within the hearing aid ecosystem, in which firms have either moved to 
3DP for producing external casing or gone out of business (D’Aveni, 2015). Despite this, the market 
leaders have not faced collapse, instead seeing their position maintained or enhanced (Sandström, 2016). 
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For suppliers of hearing aid casings, 3DP is competence-destroying and disruptive, whereas producers of 
internal electronic components may find 3DP competence-enhancing. Predictions that 3DP will have a 
disruptive impact on other ecosystems require some precision. It is unlikely that entire ecosystems will be 
replaced, but more likely that individual niches will be threatened. For example, as the speed, cost and 
volume of 3DP processes continue to improve, the niches occupied by injection molding firms may be 
threatened. Injection molding remains more economical for large volumes, but tooling remains 
prohibitively expensive, creating the opportunity for disruption.  
Our third contribution is derived from considering how an ecosystem supports the disruptive potential of 
exaptation-driven innovation. We propose that the ecosystem must evolve sufficiently to allow an 
exaptation-driven innovation to achieve external disruption of incumbents in other ecosystems. 
6. Implications and Limitations 
 
6.1 Implications for theory 
We contribute to theory at the intersection between exaptation (Andriani and Carignani, 2014; Garud et 
al., 2016, 2018), innovation ecosystems (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Ansari et al., 2016; Adner 
et al., 2017) and disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997). The innovation literature shows that 
technologies are systems of modular components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) that evolve (Sahal, 1981; 
Basalla, 1989) through the transfer of modules from one system to another (Arthur, 2009), which is 
understood in the concepts of niche construction and modular exaptation (Andriani and Carignani, 2014). 
The critical role of the ecosystem is implied (Garud et al., 2018), but not explicitly mentioned or 
investigated in the exaptation literature. Meanwhile, the disruptive innovation literature deals with 
different generations of disruptive innovations within ecosystems (Christensen, 1997; Adner and Kapoor, 
2010, 2016), and the co-opetitive dynamics between incumbents and entrants into established ecosystems 
(Ansari et al., 2016). Yet it says little about the subject of ecosystem formation and growth. Our research 
addresses these gaps by connecting the three literatures.  
This research makes three contributions to literature. Firstly, the symmetry between artifact and system 
leads to the proposition that niche construction of an exapted module is accompanied by ecosystem 
construction. Secondly, the co-opetitive dynamics within the ecosystem, caused by new entrants competing 
for niches leads to the proposition that ecosystem evolution entails internal disruption. Thirdly, the evidence 
of potential to disrupt established ecosystems leads to the proposition that external disruption demands a 
sufficiently evolved ecosystem in support of exaptation-driven innovation.  
6.2 Implications for practice 
The terms disruptive, digital and ecosystem are hyperbolically used to describe new innovations, but what 
these terms mean in practice and how to respond to them is unclear. Studying the formation of the 
ecosystem around 3DP—a set of digital production technologies—helps to illustrate some of the 
opportunities and threats managers should be aware of. Technologies increasingly combine physical and 
digital aspects, making them closely connected elements of increasingly complex innovation ecosystems.  
Ecosystems are recognized as a rich source of opportunity for entrepreneurs, but part of the challenge is 
that regardless of their starting position, firms entering into a new ecosystem may have a less central role 
and hence must balance the objectives of the ecosystem with their own (Nambisan and Baron, 2013; 
Autio et al., 2018). Managers must take a broad perspective in recognizing the sources of threats, which 
come from both ‘big fish’ and ‘little fish’, both inside and outside the ecosystem. By cultivating an 
ecosystem, either through attempts to dominate or support others, they create more attractive 
propositions for larger firms from outside of the ecosystem.  
Modular exaptation provides a useful lens through which to view disruptive innovations. For example, 
Andriani and Carignani (2014) describe how exaptation led to the development of the microwave oven 
following the identification of a component in radar equipment that could melt an engineer’s candy bar. 
They note, however, that it took two decades to gain popularity and probably longer before the 
microwave oven became disruptive to more traditional cooking appliances. The reason disruptive 
innovations are so threatening is precisely because they emerge from unexpected directions. Taking an 
ecosystem perspective would identify the microwave oven as a source of disruption and innovation for 
other services, for example, food producers could create ready meals, which in turn affects demand for 
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fast-food restaurants. Recognizing that radar equipment producers present a disruptive challenge for 
restaurants, forty years ahead, would not have been straightforward. Yet, this example illustrates how the 
complexity of ecosystems creates opportunities and threats from an almost infinite number of sources. 
The first step, however, is to consider that these challenges come from outside of the current market or 
industry (Moore, 1996) and that the digital nature of future technologies only widens the scope of 
ecosystems and sources of disruption. 
6.3 Implications for policy  
Policymakers see ecosystems as the route to supporting national, regional and local innovation (Clarysse 
et al., 2014) so understanding ecosystems is an important concern for policy. One issue is where to invest 
resources. Ecosystem leaders would be the best choice according to previous literature (Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014), but ecosystem leaders, as illustrated in our research, seek to 
maintain their position of strength, which may involve striving for domination (Fixson and Park, 2008). 
This is partly because their emphasis changes as they become the leaders, from more exploratory 
behavior, making use of available resources, to seeking sustained growth, to satisfy shareholders. An 
alternative for policymakers would be to see ecosystems as a source of opportunities through modular 
exaptation. The cases investigated in this study demonstrate how existing firms find new narratives 
(Garud et al., 2016), adapting and building on their capabilities to create new innovations. Supporting 
openness, for example, encouraging information sharing or at least helping to make the connections 
between modules and supporting services more accessible, would support the growth of an ecosystem. 
Policies aimed at supporting firms to find new markets for their existing offerings or to work together to 
repurpose their capabilities might help localized entrepreneurial ecosystems that take advantage of new 
technologies such as 3DP.  
The exaptation perspective helps to illustrate how unexpected entrants may thrive and suggests that 
policymakers should examine existing innovations that can be repurposed. Examples of disruptive 
innovation can be considered in terms of the supporting role of the ecosystem. For example, the 
disruptive potential of wind turbines on traditional energy generation has benefited from exaptation 
(Garud et al., 2018), which in turn was enabled by suitable incentives and institutional support from 
public and private sources (Garud and Karnøe, 2003).  
Policymakers should also identify barriers to exaptation, for example, Andriani and Carignani (2014) 
highlight patents as one. They point to the impossibility of knowing all possible uses for an innovation 
when it is first created, meaning that patents can prevent others from identifying a new function, e.g. 
chemicals firms find their inert gases in demand for metal 3DP, but their patents may restrict innovation. 
Meanwhile, the patenting activity of firms such as Ricoh and HP suggests the considerable R&D 
investment required for ecosystem entry through exaptation. The recent growth in adoption of 3DP has 
been in large part due to patent expiry, which has created opportunities for entrepreneurs to create and 
commercialise new products. The narratives of 3D Systems and Stratasys demonstrate how supporting 
entrepreneurs to innovate through exaptation may, in the long term, lead to disruptive innovation 
ecosystems. 
6.4 Limitations and future research 
A number of limitations arise from the methods and scope of the research, which offer opportunities for 
future research. Firstly, while the narratives uncover the mechanisms by which 3DP may lead to 
disruption of established systems, it should be noted that the final phase of the process model remains 
speculative and that experts differ on whether 3DP or the 3DP ecosystem, has yet demonstrated 
disruption (e.g. Sandström, 2016). The process outlined in the model is an ongoing one, and a follow-up 
study could revisit the assumptions and predictions of disruption. In particular, while evidence is 
presented in support of the first phases of the model, phase four is largely speculative and relies on 
predictions or espoused strategies. Research on disruptive innovation (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016) 
has benefited from the approach of updating and revisiting the same dataset, following the evolution of 
one ecosystem, and 3DP as a context would undoubtedly benefit from the same, as the technologies and 
applications emerge. Therefore, further studies should seek to establish whether and when 3DP can be 
considered a disruptive innovation as well as testing the process model. Disruptive innovations are often 
identified only after they have caused disruption, whereas 3DP offers a valuable research subject since it is 
almost widely considered to be a disruptive innovation waiting for a killer application.  
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Secondly, this study takes a selective view of a small number of firms, which helped the 3DP ecosystem 
form. Secondary data, available in the public domain, were used to understand these firms and their 
actions. The lack of primary data collection, such as interviews with decision makers can be viewed as a 
weakness. Meanwhile, using a varied range of sources helps to avoid unconscious biases related to recall 
or social desirability, which can call into question the validity of interviews. As the availability of data has 
increased, so has the innovative use of such data in research (Koppman and Leahey, 2019). The present 
study therefore follows the increasingly common approach of using data from publicly available sources 
(e.g,Turnheim and Geels, 2019; Franzoni and Sauermann (2014). 
Thirdly, the narrative method is, by its nature, interpretive in its approach. Narratives are constructed, or 
enacted, in a process of sense-making, rather than describing a set of events (Pentland, 1999; Garud et al., 
2016). This means that narratives may privilege one interpretation while suppressing others (Brown, 
1998). We used quotations from a number of sources to make sense of events and to provide a structure 
that connects the events. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that alternative perspectives and ways of seeing 
the events are possible. In particular, we present the invention of 3DP technologies as illustrative of 
modular exaptation and seek to identify serendipity and functional change in the accounts of their 
invention. We acknowledge that alternative perspectives may be used to argue otherwise. Despite this 
possibility, we believe the process model, connecting exaptation, ecosystem formation and disruption, is 
theoretically valid.  
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Figure 1 — Illustration of disruptive innovation through exaptation and ecosystem building. Ecosystems consist of multiple firms that create modules of products. 












Figure 3 — Timeline of 3D Systems’ and Stratasys’ narratives 
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Table 1 — Process Model applied to 3DP Ecosystem. 
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Appendix 1 — Summary of key details for 3D Systems and Stratasys 
 3D systems Stratasys 
Founding date 1986 1989 
First patented 
technology 
“Apparatus for Production of 
Three-dimensional Objects by 
Stereolithography” Patent 
4575330A (1986) 
“Apparatus and Method for Creating 
Three-dimensional Objects”  
Patent 5121329 (1992) 
IPO date June 3, 2011 October 20, 1994 
Headquarters Rock Hill, South Carolina, United 
States 
Eden Prairie, Minnesota, United States 
/ Rehovot, Israel 
Founder Chuck Hull (currently CTO) S. Scott Crump (currently Chairman) 
CEO Vyomesh Joshi (4 Apr 2016) Ilan Levin (1 Jul 2016) 
Key Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
2014 Cimatron ($97m) — 
Design software 
2014 Simbionix ($120m) — 
Medical simulation and training 
solutions 
2013 Xerox’s 3DP assets 
($32.5m) 
2009 Acu-Cast Technologies 
(undisclosed) — custom 
manufacturing 
2001 DTM ($45m) — 3D 
Printing 
2015 Econolyst (undisclosed) — 
Strategic consultancy 
2014 GrabCAD ($100m) — Design 
software 
2014 Solid Concepts & Harvest Tech. 
(undisclosed) — custom manufacturing 
2012 Objet ($634m) — 3D printing, 
resulted in creation of Stratasys Inc. 
2011 Solidscape — ($38m) Aerospace 
Manufacturing 
1995 IBM’s 3DP assets ($0.5m and 
0.5m shares in Stratasys) 
Technologies Stereolithography (SLA),  
Selective Laser Sintering (SLS),  
Color-Jet Printing (CJP),  
Multi-Jet Printing (MJP),  
Direct Metal Printing (DMP) 
PolyJet,  
Fused Deposition Modelling (FDM) 
Revenue1 $633 million $696 million 
Market 
Capitalization2 
$1.022 billion $1.155 billion 
R&D as a % of 
revenue 
3.4% 3.5% 
1Revenues as reported for 2016 




Appendix 2 — 3D Systems’ and Stratasys’ sales revenues 2009-2017 in thousands of USD, based 
on annual reports. 
 
